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Abstract 
 
 
Why do firms hold so many liquid assets on their balance sheets? The amount of a firm’s 
liquidity depends on its treasury management policy. There are several justifications 
regarding possession of liquid assets. The finance literature highlights three theoretical 
models that explain how the companies’ characteristics influence the levels of cash, there 
are the trade-off, pecking order and free cash flow theories. This study tests the 
predictions resulting from several factors that are suggested by the above mentioned 
theories. We find that the firm’s growth opportunities, leverage and dividend payments 
have positive effects on cash holdings. Additionally, longer debt maturity and cash flow 
generated by the firm exert a negative effect. Therefore, it can be concluded that the trade-
off theory best explains the evolution of the liquidity of listed companies in Portugal. We 
also find that governance characteristics play an interesting role concerning the levels of 
cash. Moreover, we find that the 2008 financial crisis impact on the firms’ cash holdings 
and its financial characteristics. In particular, the growth opportunities cease to be 
significant in a post-crisis period, while the negative effect of the cash flow generated by 
the firm gains significance in the post-crisis period.  
 
 
Key-words: Cash holdings; Trade-off theory; Pecking order theory; Free cash flow 
theory; Corporate governance; Financial crisis of 2008 
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Resumo 
 
Por que razão possui uma empresa tantos ativos líquidos no seu balanço? A quantidade 
de liquidez de uma empresa depende da sua política de gestão de tesouraria. Existem 
diversas justificações para a posse de ativos líquidos. A literatura em finanças destaca três 
modelos teóricos que explicam como as características das empresas influenciam no nível 
da tesouraria das mesmas, a saber são a teoria de trade-off, a teoria pecking order e a 
teoria free cash flow. Este estudo testa as previsões decorrentes dos vários fatores que são 
sugeridos pelos modelos anteriores. Concluindo que as oportunidades de crescimento, 
alavancagem e pagamento de dividendos da empresa têm efeitos positivos sobre os níveis 
de liquidez. Além disso, uma estrutura dívida de longo prazo e fluxo de caixa gerado pela 
empresa de exerce um efeito negativo. Assim, pode-se concluir que a teoria de trade-off 
é aquela que melhor consegue explicar a evolução da liquidez das empresas cotadas em 
Portugal. Concluímos também que as características de governo das empresas 
desempenham um papel interessante na gestão de liquidez. Além disso, descobrimos que 
a crise financeira de 2008 tem um impacto relevante sobre o nível de liquidez e as suas 
características. Em específico, as oportunidades de crescimento deixam de ser fatores 
determinantes significativos num período de pós-crise, ao passo que o efeito negativo do 
fluxo de caixa gerado pela empresa ganha significância no período pós-crise.  
 
Palavras-chave: Gestão de liquidez; Teoria de trade-off; Teoria pecking order; Teoria 
free cash flow; Governo empresarial; Crise financeira de 2008 
Classificação JEL: G3, G32, G39 
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1. Introduction 
 
Cash is a key asset on a firm’s balance sheets and receives a significant attention not just 
from companies, but also investors and financial analysts. In late 2000 the amount of cash 
or cash equivalents held by firms in the European Monetary Union (EMU) amounted to 
14.8% of their total book value of assets (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). More recently and 
regarding U.S. market, in the year 2006 the average cash-to-assets ratio held by firms 
amounted to around 23% (Bates et al., 2009). Why do firms hold large quantities of cash 
and cash equivalents?  
Some managers argue that the companies with high cash, or cash equivalents levels, allow 
them to quickly take advantage of profitable investment opportunities, and avoid extra 
financing costs (Mikkelson and Partch, 2003). Actually there are four broadly accepted 
motives for cash holdings: transaction, precautionary, the agency and tax motives 
(Keynes, 1936; Jensen, 1986; Foley et al., 2007). The finance literature also identifies 
three theoretical models that can help to explain which firm characteristics influence cash 
holdings decisions. The trade-off theory suggests that firms identify an optimal level of 
cash holdings by weighing its costs and benefits (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Then, the 
pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) introduces the importance of asymmetric 
information. In order to minimise it, firms should finance their investments internally. 
Lastly, the free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) suggests that managers have incentives 
to accumulate large amounts of cash, in order to reduce pressure to improve their 
performance.  
Many authors have studied important aspects of corporate cash holdings. Kim et al. 
(1998), Opler et al. (1999), Mikkelson and Partch (2003) and Bates et al. (2009) all 
present studies concerning U.S. firms. In contrast, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) focus in 
EMU firms’ while Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) analyse UK firms. In addition Drobetz and 
Grüninger (2007) study the case of Swiss firms and Teruel and Solano (2008) investigate 
the case of small and medium-size enterprises in Spain, among other studies.  
In this research, we examine the empirical characteristics of cash holdings, by testing 
factors that have been proposed by previous authors. We focus on factors related to 
financial characteristics, and we also perform a sensitivity analysis concerning the 
governance data. The research sample is composed by 43 firms and comprises data over 
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the period between 1995 and 2015. Considering the absence of studies examining the 
determinants of cash holdings of Portuguese listed firms over the period of financial 
crisis, it may be also interesting to explore the effect of the financial crisis on the 
determining factors for cash holdings. However, the main goal of this research is to study 
the effects of the determining factors associated to the trade-off, pecking order and free 
cash flow theories for corporate cash holdings of Portuguese listed firms.   
The main findings of our study are the positive and significant association between cash 
holdings and growth opportunities, leverage and dividend payments, while long debt 
maturity and cash flow generated by the firms exert a negative effect. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the trade-off theory collects the strongest support. In contrast, the model 
with least support is the free cash flow theory. In addition, we also conclude that 
governance factors could play an interesting role concerning cash levels. Moreover, we 
find that the financial crisis of 2008 influenced on the relation between cash levels of 
Portuguese firms and its determining factors. Specifically, the growth opportunities cease 
to be significant in a post-crisis period, while the negative effect of the cash flow 
generated by the firm gains significance in the post-crisis period.  
The structure of this study will proceed as follows. The second section presents the 
literature review, which presents the main motives for cash holdings, the main theories 
and introduces some governance issues that could influence on cash levels. In addition, 
the second section also includes the empirical findings of similar studies. The third section 
presents our hypotheses. In the fourth section, we describe the data and the methodology 
adopted in the empirical phase. The fifth section presents the results and its analysis. 
Finally, in section 6, we discuss the findings and suggestions for further research. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
The following section is divided into four different subsections. The first one explains the 
main motives for cash holdings, the second states the three theoretical models concerning 
corporate cash holdings and their determinant factors most accepted by the literature in 
finance. The third section introduces some issues regarding corporate governance and 
cash holdings. The last section presents the main results of similar studies. 
 
2.1. Theoretical Motives for Cash Holdings 
 
Safeguarding that a firm has adequate liquid assets to finance their future projects is at 
the heart of the practice of financial management1. Excess cash, is typically defined as 
cash and marketable securities above that used in the normal course of the business (Lins, 
et al., 2010). Founded on the assumption of perfect financial markets, assuming no 
transaction costs, taxes, asymmetric information and bankruptcy costs, the capital 
structure does not affect firm value. Thus, there would be no reason for a company to 
hold liquid assets.  In case of necessity, requesting a loan from a bank would be enough, 
thus companies’ financial decisions would not affect their value (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958; Stiglitz, 1974)2. However, there are market imperfections which imply different 
motives for corporate cash holdings. The theory of demand for money by firms (Keynes, 
1936) and the agency theory (Jensen, 1986) clarify why a firm would choose to hold cash. 
According to Keynes (1936) there are two major motives for corporate cash holdings: the 
transaction costs and precautionary motives. The transaction costs motive states that a 
firm benefits from holding liquid assets because these provide a way to save on 
transaction costs: (i) the cost of raising external finance; (ii) the cost of liquidating assets. 
The precautionary motive, highlights the importance of anticipating future necessities and 
investment opportunities. Thus, precautionary cash holdings seek to self-insure against 
costly or unavailable external finance and provide financing in case of investment 
opportunities. In recent years, many authors add findings about precautionary cash 
holdings. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) find a negative association between the level of 
                                                             
1 Cash holdings are usually defined as cash and marketable securities, or cash and cash equivalents (Opler 
et al., 1999). 
2 The Modigliani and Miller theorem suggests that the value of an unleveraged firm is equals the value of 
a leverage firm (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
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capital markets development and cash holdings, which supports the precautionary 
motives for cash holdings. In addition, Almeida et al. (2004) study the relation of the 
cash’s accumulation according the precautionary motive and the presence of financial 
constraints. Their results suggest that constrained firms tend to increase their liquid assets. 
Bates et al., (2009) also suggest that firms accumulate cash to face unexpected financial 
crisis. 
The agency theory (Jensen, 1986) also offers a possible explanation for firms’ cash 
holdings. In the presence of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, such 
as asymmetric information or incomplete contracts, managers tend to accumulate cash in 
order to proceed with their strategies. Dittmar et al. (2003) empathize the importance of 
the agency problem as a deterministic factor that influences cash holdings. Diitmar et al. 
(2007) highlight the effect of governance on the value of excess cash, they find that “the 
value of a dollar of cash is substantially less if a firm has poor corporate governance” 
(Dittmar et al., 2007, p. 627). In addition, they also find that entrenched managers are 
more likely to accumulate cash. 
A fourth reason for holding liquidity is connected with a tax system motive. Multinational 
companies may collect cash in foreign subsidiaries to avoid the repatriation tax expense 
they would suffer if they were to repatriate the profits earned in foreign jurisdictions 
(Foley et al., 2007).  
Founded on the previous motives, the level of cash holdings of a firm is the result of a 
balance between the costs and benefits of liquidity and of also of the interests of all 
stakeholders.  
2.2. Cash Holdings Theories 
 
The corporate cash holdings characteristics are usually explained on the basis of three 
theories: the Trade-off, Pecking Order and Free Cash Flow Theories. In order to clarify 
the rationale behind each theory and to easily review the predictions by each one, we will 
follow the structure proposed by Ferreira and Vilela (2004).  
2.2.1. Trade-off Theory 
 
According to the trade-off theory, firms tend to establish an optimal cash level and in 
order to reach that, they weigh the cash holdings’ benefits and the cash holdings’ costs 
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(Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Assuming that a manager’s goal is to 
maximize the shareholders’ wealth, they will set the firm’s cash holdings in a way that 
the marginal benefits equal the marginal cost of holding cash. The optimal amount of cash 
is given by the intersection of the marginal cost of liquid assets curve and the marginal 
cost of liquid asset shortage curve. 
Figure 1: Optimal holdings of liquid assets. 
 
Source: Opler et al. (1999) 
Note: Figure 1 shows, under Opler et al. (1999) assumptions, that the amount of liquid assets is given by 
the intersection of the marginal cost of liquid assets and the marginal cost of liquid asset shortage curves. 
The marginal cost curve of being short of liquid assets is downward sloping and the marginal cost curve of 
holding liquid assets is assumed to be horizontal. “With the transaction costs model, the cost of liquid assets 
is their lower pecuniary expected return, because part of the benefit from holding liquid assets is that they 
can be more easily converted into cash. There is no reason to think that this cost varies with the amount of 
liquid assets held. If the firm has a shortage of liquid assets, it can cope with the shortage by either 
decreasing investment or dividends, or by raising outside funds through security issuances or asset sales. 
A greater shortage has greater costs, because addressing a larger shortage involves decreasing investment 
more or raising more outside funds” (Opler et al., 1999, p. 8) 
 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) suggest that the benefits of holding cash include a reduction of 
the likelihood of financial distress through the fact that cash holdings (i) act as a buffer 
against unexpected losses, (ii) minimize the costs of raising external funds and (iii) 
minimize the risks associated with the sale of company’s assets in order to maintain the 
investment policy in case of financial distress. On the other hand, the main cash holding’s 
cost is the opportunity cost associated to the low return of liquid assets. In addition, 
agency problems between the management team and shareholders may be exacerbated 
when cash levels are high (Opler et al., 1999). According to the trade-off theory, firms 
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reach their own optimal level of cash holdings when the marginal benefit of holding cash 
is equal to its marginal cost. 
Then, and based on the trade-off theory, one can derive the expected relation between 
some firm characteristics and corporate cash holdings as follows: 
a) Leverage – leverage can increase the likelihood of financial distress, “due to the 
pressure that rigid amortization plans put on the firm treasury management” (Ferreira 
and Vilela, 2004, p. 299). Thus, we should expect that companies with higher leverage 
will hold more cash as this acts as an insurance, which reduces the probability of future 
financial distress. However, “to the extent that leverage ratio acts as a proxy for the 
ability of the firms to issue debt it would be expected that firms with higher leverage 
(higher ability to raise debt) hold less cash” (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004, p. 299). Hence, 
the predicted relationship between cash holdings and leverage is ambiguous. 
b) Size – according to Miller and Orr (1966), the models to determine the optimal cash 
holdings show that there are economies of scale associated with the cash levels, thus 
larger firms can keep lower cash holdings. Furthermore, raising funds is comparatively 
more expensive for smaller firms than larger firms (Barclay and Smith, 1996; Peterson 
and Rajan, 2002); hence small firms tend to hold more cash than larger ones. Thus, a 
negative relation between firm size and cash holdings is expected. 
c) Cash flow – cash flow represents an extra source of liquidity for the firm, which can 
be seen as a cash substitute (Kim et al., 1998). Therefore, a negative relation between 
cash flow and cash holdings is expected. 
d) Debt maturity structure – Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and Teruel and Solano (2008) 
suggest that the distribution of debt maturities between short and long terms can affect 
decisions regarding cash holdings. Firms that rely on short-term debt must periodically 
renegotiate their credit terms, and are subject to the risk of experiencing financial distress 
if constraints are met to the renewal of credit lines. Consequently, we should expect a 
negative relation between debt maturity and cash holdings. However, Barclay and Smith 
(1995) find that firms with the highest credit risk issue more short-term debt, while 
intermediate credit risk firm issue long-term debt. If we consider that firms with the 
highest credit ratings have better access to borrowing, it is expected that these firms will 
hold less cash, thus the expected relation between debt maturity structure and cash levels 
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is positive. Concluding, the sign of the association between the debt maturity structure 
and the levels of cash is ambiguous. 
e) Liquidity – the existence of liquid assets apart from cash and cash equivalents (e.g. 
debtors and inventories) can also impact the firm’s optimal cash holdings, since they can 
be considered cash substitutes. Therefore, a company with more non-cash liquid assets 
tends to reduce their cash holdings level, so a negative relation between non-cash liquid 
assets and cash holdings is expected (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004).  
f) Growth opportunities – Due to the fact that costly external financing raises the 
probability of a firm passing on sizeable investment opportunities, firms should hold 
sufficient liquid assets in order to be able to take advantage of the profitable opportunities 
(Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Thus, firms with many investment 
opportunities tend to accumulate larger amounts of cash. 
g) Dividend payments – Ferreira and Vilela (2004) suggest that firms that pay dividends 
can raise funds at a low cost by reducing dividend payments. On the other hand, firms 
that do not pay dividends would have to use external funding, which would be more 
costly. Thus, a negative association between dividend payments and cash holdings is 
expected. 
2.2.2. Pecking Order Theory  
 
The pecking order theory was proposed by Myers (1984) and is based on a asymmetric 
information theory, proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984), which states that the 
information asymmetries between managers and shareholders make external financing 
costly. According to pecking order theory, and in a context of asymmetric information 
between management team (insiders) and financing institutions (outsiders), there is an 
optimal hierarchy regarding the firm’s financing. To minimize asymmetric information 
costs and financing costs, firms should finance investments with retained earnings, then 
debt, and finally with equity. They only use external sources of funding when the first 
alternative is exhausted.  
The pecking order theory suggests that firms do not have target cash levels, but cash 
holdings are used as a buffer between retained earnings and investments needs. When 
current operational cash flows are sufficient to finance new investments, firms repay debt 
and accumulate cash. In contrast the, if operating cash flows are not enough to finance 
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current investments, firms use the accumulated cash holdings and, if needed, issue debt 
(Opler et al., 1999). 
The determinants of cash holdings that are inferred from the pecking order theory are thus 
the following:  
a) Leverage – debt will grow when investment exceeds retained earnings and will 
decrease when investment is less than retained earnings. Then, cash holdings will 
decrease when investment is bigger than retained earnings and will increase when the 
opposite happens (Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). This relationship 
between cash, debt and investment suggests that there is a negative relation between cash 
and leverage. 
b) Size – larger firms tend to be more successful, consequently should have higher levels 
of cash after controlling for investment (Opler et al., 1999). Hence, larger firms are 
expected to hold more cash. 
c) Cash flow – firms prefer to fund themselves with internal resources and so firms with 
larger amounts of cash flow will maintain higher cash levels. 
d) Growth opportunities – according to Ferreira and Vilela (2004), in the presence of a 
huge set of investment opportunities firms require large amount of cash, because cash 
shortfalls would imply that the firms would have to sacrifice profitable growth 
opportunities. So, the expected relation between growth opportunities and cash holdings 
is positive3. 
2.2.3. Free Cash Flow Theory  
 
The free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986), suggests that managers have incentives to hold 
a large amount of cash on a company’s balance sheet, which implies a bigger 
discretionary power regarding company investment decisions. According to Jensen 
(1986) “free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that 
have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital” (Jensen, 
1986, p. 323). Thus, a large amount of cash on a company’s balance sheet means a higher 
managerial power as he/she does not need to raise external funds to finance new 
                                                             
3 The signal prediction is aligned with the trade-off theory, however the interpretation is different. The 
trade-off theory is based on transaction cost perspective, and the pecking order theory represents the 
precautionary motive of holding cash. 
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investments. This theory suggests that management decisions are guided managers’ own 
interest. The presence of cash, or cash equivalents, on a company’s balance sheet reduces 
the pressure on the management team to reach a good performance and allows the 
managers to invest according to their self-interests, and probably against shareholders’ 
ones.  
Regarding the free cash flow theory, it is therefore important to take into account the 
following potential determinant factors for cash holdings: 
a) Leverage – the agency perspective highlights the monitoring role of debt. The 
management team of a highly leveraged firm is disciplined through debt covenants and 
requirements that are imposed by creditors. Therefore, managers would have less 
discretionary power. In contrast, managers in firms with a low level of leverage are 
subject to less monitoring which allows them to have a bigger discretionary power. 
Hence, the expected relation between leverage and cash holdings is negative (Opler et al., 
1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004).  
b) Size – larger firms tend to have a larger shareholder dispersion, which gives rise to 
superior managerial discretion due to the free riding problem. Consequently, it is expected 
that managers of larger firms have more discretionary power over the firm investment 
and financial policies, which leads to higher cash levels (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
c) Growth Opportunities – from an agency perspective, entrenched managers of firms 
with poor investment opportunities, tend to hold more cash in order to ensure an 
availability of funds to invest even in negative NPV projects (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; 
Drobetz and Grüninger, 2007). Eventually, this would lead to a destruction of shareholder 
value. Then, according to this perspective the relation between growth opportunities and 
cash holdings would be negative.  
As it turns out, the impact of the firms’ characteristics on cash holdings is not a consensual 
matter among these theories. The following table summarizes the impact of each variable 
among to the three above mentioned theories. 
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Table 1: Summary of models predictions 
Variable Trade-off Theory Pecking Order Theory Free Cash Flow Theory 
Dividend payments - n.a. n.a. 
Growth opportunities + + - 
Liquidity - n.a. n.a. 
Leverage -/+ - - 
Size - + + 
Cash flow - + n.a. 
Debt maturity -/+ n.a. n.a. 
The table exhibits the different relations between firm factors and cash holdings across each theory. In the 
table, a “+” means that the firm factor is positively related to cash holdings. A “-” means a negative relation 
between the firm factor and cash holdings. A “n.a.” means that the model in case does not make any 
assumptions regarding the variable in question. Source: Ferreira and Vilela (2004). 
 
2.3. Ownership and Board Structure 
 
This section discusses the possible association between governance factors and corporate 
cash holdings. We mainly focus on the presence of the largest shareholders and on the 
board structure. 
 
2.3.1. The largest shareholders  
 
The presence of a large shareholder might be an important factor concerning implications 
on the level of cash holding associated with agency problems. It is arguable that one way 
to control the agency problem between managers and shareholders is to effectively 
monitor managers. However, an average shareholder might not have strong incentives to 
monitor managers, as the costs of monitoring are likely to outweigh the benefits 
(Grossman and Hart, 1988). In contrast, large shareholders, having claims on a large 
fraction of the firm’s cash flows, can monitor managers more effectively. Consequently, 
in the presence of a large shareholder, managerial discretion is likely to be curbed and 
agency costs between management and shareholders are expected to be lower (Stiglitz, 
1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). This, in turn, suggests that the cost of external 
financing would be lower for firms with large shareholders, implying less need to hold 
large cash balances.  
However, one can also argue that large shareholders might have incentives to increase the 
amount of funds under their control to take advantage of self-interest (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). This argument would suggest a positive relationship between large 
shareholders and cash holdings. In order to control for this factor, we incorporate the 
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percentage of the largest two shareholders’ voting rights as an independent variable in 
our empirical analysis. 
2.3.2. Board Structure 
 
The literature in finance shows that the board composition can have an impact on the 
alignment between managers and shareholders’ interests. Inside (executive) directors 
provide firm specific knowledge that assists the board in understanding the detailed 
aspects of the firm’s business. On the opposite, outside (non-executive) directors 
contribute with expertise and objectivity that ostensibly mitigates managerial 
entrenchment of firm resources (Harford et al., 2008). It is argued that outside directors 
are appointed to act in the shareholders’ interests (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997; Mayers 
et al., 1997). Harris and Raviv (2008) find that in a high agency costs scenario, outsider-
control is optimal. However, Harris and Raviv (2008) also suggest that outside board 
control may be value-reducing. “In particular, if insiders have important information 
relative to that of outsiders, giving control to outsiders may result in loss of information 
that is more costly than the agency cost associated with inside control” (Harris and Raviv, 
2008, p.1830).  
Regarding the firm’s board size, the literature suggests that increased board size has two 
competing effects: greater monitoring versus more rigid decision-making. Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) defend that board size affects corporate governance 
independently from other board attributes. Directors rarely criticize top managers and 
problems therefore tend to increase with number of board members. Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) also recommend limiting membership to seven or eight people. In addition, Jensen 
(1993) suggests that “as groups increase in size they become less effective because the 
coordination and process problems overwhelm the advantages gained from having more 
people to draw on” (Jensen, 1993, p. 865). Moreover, Yermack (1996) also finds that 
smaller boards are more efficient concerning decision-making matters, and Boone et al. 
(2007) find that firms in which managers’ opportunities to consume private benefits are 
larger, or in which the cost of monitoring managers is small, have larger boards. 
Additionally, they also find that larger and more diverse firms tend to have larger and 
more independent boards, whereas in contrast, firms in which managers have substantial 
influence have less independent boards. 
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In order to test the board structure role, the present study adopts two variables. The first 
one is the total number of board members. The next variable is a measure of the degree 
of board independence: the percentage of independent non-executive directors on the total 
number of board members. 
2.4. Empirical Evidence 
 
Numerous studies have focused on assessing cash holdings across different countries, 
firm sizes or industries in order to establish a relationship between asset management 
practices and firm performance. Below we present some of the most important empirical 
studies’ results concerning cash balances. 
Kim et al. (1998) analyze the determinants of cash holdings for a sample of 915 U.S. 
industrial firms over the period from 1975 to 1994. They report that firms with higher 
growth opportunities, measured by market-to-book ratios, and lower returns on assets 
have significantly larger positions in liquid assets. On the other hand, firm size appears 
to be negatively related to cash holdings, but never significant. They conclude that “these 
results support the model’s prediction of a positive relation between liquidity and the cost 
of external financing to the extent that the market-to-book ratio and firm size are 
reasonable proxies for the cost of external financing” (Kim et al., 1998, p. 355).  
Opler et al., (1999) examine the determinants of corporate holdings of cash and 
marketable securities among publicly traded U.S. firms from the period of 1971 – 1994. 
They find that firms with strong growth opportunities, riskier activities and small firms 
tend to hold more cash. In contrast, firms with good access to capital markets, such as 
large firms and those with good credit ratings, tend to hold less cash. In addition, using 
cross-sectional data for 1994, the authors are not successful in demonstrating that proxies 
for agency costs have a significant impact on cash holdings. The evidence presented by 
the researchers is consistent with the view that management accumulates excess cash if it 
has the opportunity to do so, they argue that the main motivation for this behavior seems 
to be the precautionary motive for cash holdings. 
Mikkelson and Partch (2003) investigate U.S. firms that held more than one-fourth of 
their assets as cash and cash equivalents at the end of each of the years 1986 through 
1991. They find in the ensuing five years, firms with such large cash holdings have a 
median operating performance that is greater than the performance of firms matched by 
size and industry. Moreover, high cash firms grow faster and undertake higher levels of 
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investment. Additionally, governance characteristics, such as ownership, board 
composition and control by a founder do not explain the differences in cash levels. 
Dittmar et al. (2003) explore the relation between corporate governance and corporate 
cash holdings for a sample of more than 11000 firms from 45 countries for the year of 
1998. Their results reveal that the firms in countries with low shareholder protection hold 
up to twice as much cash as firms in countries with high shareholder protection. In the 
case of poor shareholder protection, factors that determine the cash holding levels, such 
as investment opportunities and asymmetric information become less important. In 2007, 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith added new findings concerning governance implications. Using 
1952 U.S. listed firms from 1990 to 2003, they find evidence of high levels of cash could 
be problematic and value destroying in case of poorly governed and/or managers are 
poorly monitored.  
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) study the determinants of corporate cash holdings for a sample 
of 400 firms in 12 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries4 from 1987 to 2000. 
Their results suggest that the amount of cash held by firms is positively affected by the 
investment opportunity set and cash flows. In contrast, the amount of cash held by firms 
is negatively affected by the amount of liquid asset substitutes, leverage and size. In 
addition, firms in countries with superior investor protection and concentrated ownership 
hold less cash, which supports the agency perspective of the role of managerial discretion. 
They also suggest a negative relation between the development of capital markets and 
cash levels. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) study the empirical determinants of corporate cash holdings 
from a sample of UK firms from 1984 to 1999. They find that the existence of non-cash 
liquid assets and leverage has a negative influence on levels of cash. The authors also 
focus on the importance of managerial ownership, board structure and ultimate controllers 
of companies. Contrary to the findings of Mikkelson and Partch (2003), they conclude 
that  managerial ownership plays an important role regarding the cash holdings. They find 
a non-monotonic association between both variables, and firms with managerial 
ownership between 20% and 30% have the lowest cash levels. In addition, they provide 
                                                             
4 The 12 EMU countries are: Germany, Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Belgium, Ireland, Finland and Luxemburg. 
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evidence that firms controlled by families hold higher levels of cash and marketable 
securities. 
Guney et al. (2007) investigate the cash holding behavior of firms from France, German, 
Japan, UK and US. Their study includes 4069 firms from 1996 and 2000. Firstly, they 
present a detailed analysis concerning the relation between cash holdings and leverage. 
In particular, they establish that borrowing decision of firms exert a non-linear impact on 
cash holdings decisions. Hence, leverage can act as a substitute for cash holdings, but at 
same time increases the probability of financial distress, which suggests high levels of 
cash. “Hence, one observes first a negative relationship at lower levels of leverage and 
the observed relation becomes positive at high leverage levels” (Guney et al., 2007, p. 
59). Secondly, their study also focuses on the importance of corporate governance 
aspects. They find that the degree of investor protection can influence the cash policies 
of firms. Specifically, strong investor protection and high ownership concentration seem 
to lead firms to hold lower cash balances.  
Regarding Swiss non-financial firms, Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) investigate the 
determinants of cash holdings for a sample of 156 firms between 1995 and 2004. They 
argue that dividend payments and operating cash flows are positively related to cash 
reserves. They also find a negative relation concerning the firm size. Moreover, they 
suggest a positive relation between cash holdings and CEO duality as well as a non-
significant relation between cash holding and board size. 
In a study focused on the corporate cash holdings of 860 small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in Spain from 1996 to 2001, Teruel and Solano (2008) find a negative 
relation between bank debt and cash holdings and a positive one concerning cash levels 
and the existence of growth opportunities, although the last one with small economic 
impact. Moreover, their results support the hypothesis that firms with more short-term 
debt, which are therefore likely to have greater information asymmetry, also hold more 
cash. Lastly, the most important economic impact is for the existence of substitutes of 
cash, which exerts a negative effect on firm’s cash holdings. In contrast, they find little 
empirical support for the influence of leverage on cash levels.  
Bates et al. (2009) investigate how cash levels of U.S. firms developed since 1980 and 
their determinants. They highlight the evolution of the average cash-to-assets ratio, which 
increased by 0.46% per year from 1980 until 2006. According their results, the main 
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reasons for the positive cash ratio’s evolution was because firms’ cash flows became 
riskier, with firms holding fewer inventories and receivables and increasing R&D 
expenses.  
Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011) study the association of corporate cash holdings and 
dividend policy using a sample of 400 firms, during the period from 1991 to 2008. 
Regarding cash holdings, the authors suggest that they are influenced by dividends, 
leverage, size, risk, profitability, working capital ratio and growth opportunities, while 
dividend policy is affected by cash, leverage, growth opportunities, size, risk and profit. 
The empirical research could expose distinct characteristics of corporate cash holdings 
across different countries, firm sizes and over time. The following table summarizes the 
most important findings about financial characteristics of cash holdings. 
16 
 
Table 2: Financial determinants of firms’ cash holdings 
 
 
Authors  Growth opportunities Leverage Debt maturity 
structure 
Cash flow Liquidity Size Dividend payment 
Kim et al. (1998) + - n.a. - n.a. n.s. n.a. 
Opler et al. (1999) + - n.a. + - - - 
Dittmar et al. 
(2003)5 
+ n.a. n.a. + - - n.a. 
Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004) 
+ - n.a. + - n.s. n.s. 
Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004) 
+ - n.s. + - - n.s. 
Guney et al. (2007) + -/+ n.a. - + n.s. - 
Drobetz and 
Grüninger (2007) 
n.s. -/+ n.a. + - - + 
Teruel and Solano 
(2008) 
+ + - + - - n.a. 
Bates et al. (2009) + - n.a. -/+ - -/+ -/+ 
Al-Najjar and 
Belghitar (2011) 
+ - n.a. n.s. - - - 
The table presents the relation between cash holdings and firm’s financial characteristics. In this table, a “+” means that the firm factor is positively related with the cash 
holdings. A “-” means a negative relation between the firm factor and the cash holdings. The “n.s.” means that the authors do not find a significant relation between firms’ 
characteristics and cash levels. Cases in which authors did not test the respective variables are denoted with “n.a.”. 
                                                             
5 The table introduces the pooled cross-country estimates. 
17 
 
The present study will differentiate from others studies, first of all because it’s only 
applied to a Portuguese sample. The majority of the studies regarding corporate cash 
holdings focus on U.S. firms (e.g. Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Mikkelson and 
Partch, 2003; Bates et al., 2009) or on portfolios composed by firms from different 
countries (e.g. Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Guney et al., 2007). At same time and 
considering that one reason for cash holdings is the agency motive (Jensen, 1986), we 
will address not only financial factors but also corporate governance characteristics. Some 
studies previously suggest that governance factors could play an important role 
concerning cash holdings decision (e.g. Dittmar et al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; 
Guney et al. 2007), thus we intend to explore if the same is applicable to the Portuguese 
listed firms. Finally, the main motives for cash holdings are suggested under the 
assumption of stable economic environment. Thus this research also intends to understand 
the influence of the financial crisis of 2008 on the financial determinants of Portuguese 
firms’ cash holdings. In other words, we intend to understand the relation between cash 
holdings and its determinant factors in a post-crisis period. 
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3. Hypotheses Development  
 
This section, based on the theories and empirical evidence of previous studies, introduces 
our research hypotheses and identifies what in our view are the most important 
determining factors for corporate cash holdings and their expected relation (positive 
and/or negative) with cash holdings. Additionally, this section includes our research 
hypotheses concerning the influence of the cash holdings’ characteristics in a post-crisis 
period. 
(i) Growth Opportunities 
According to several studies (e.g. Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 
2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Guney et al., 2007) the existence of growth opportunities 
is an important factor, which positively affects cash levels. Myers and Majluf (1984) state 
that firms whose value is largely determined by their growth opportunities incur higher 
external financing. Thus, companies with greater growth opportunities should have higher 
external financing costs. As a consequence, we should expect that companies with greater 
opportunities to invest will keep higher levels of cash. This association is in accordance 
with the trade-off and pecking order theories. The first highlights a transaction costs 
perspective while the second theory emphasizes a precautionary perspective. Therefore 
we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive association between growth opportunities 
and cash holdings. 
(ii) Firm size 
Based on the economies of scale associated with the cash levels (Miller and Orr, 1966), 
the trade-off theory suggests a negative association between cash holdings and firm size. 
Hence, larger firms can keep lower cash holdings. The empirical findings of Opler et al. 
(1999) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004) confirm evidence in favor of the trade-off theory. 
On the contrary, both the pecking order and free cash flow theories predict a positive 
association between cash levels and firm size. The former assumes that large firms are 
presumably more successful, so these should have been more able to accumulate higher 
cash reserves (Opler et al., 1999). The latter, asserts that managers of larger firms have 
more discretionary power to hold excess cash without fearing a potential takeover. 
Consequently, we can also hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a relation between firm and cash holdings, the sign 
of which is ambiguous. 
(iii) Leverage 
The leverage ratio can impact the firms’ cash holdings. The empirical evidence (Kim et 
al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Bates et 
al., 2009) demonstrates a reduction in cash levels when firms increase their leverage. At 
the same time, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) suggest that firms with a high level of debt are 
not able to accumulate cash, because they are better monitored when compared to firms 
with relatively low debt. Thus, based on the previous empirical findings and on both the 
pecking order and free cash flow theories, we define the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a negative relation between leverage and cash 
holdings. 
(iv) Debt maturity structure 
Teruel and Solano (2008) suggest that the firm’s debt maturity structure can have a 
significant impact on cash holdings. Firms that use more short-term debt, which means a 
shorter debt maturity ratio6, are firms that need to negotiate the renewal of their credits 
periodically. Hence firms with a large proportion of short-term debt will keep higher cash 
levels in order to avoid the financial distress in case of difficulties regarding the renewal 
of their credits. Accordingly, our hypothesis becomes: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): There is a negative relation between the ratio of long term 
debt over total debt and the dependent variable. 
(v) Dividend payments 
According to Opler et al. (1999) and Guney et al. (2007), a firm that pays dividends is 
able to hold less cash. In case of liquid assets’ shortage, it can cope with the shortage by 
cutting dividends. The trade off theory suggests that a firm that currently pays dividends 
can raise funds at a low cost by reducing its dividend payments, in contrast to a firm that 
does not pay dividends. Based on the trade off theory and previous empirical studies, the 
hypothesis is: 
                                                             
6 Based on Teruel and Solano (2008), we measure debt maturity structure as the ratio of long term debt over 
total debt. 
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Hypothesis 5 (H5): There is a negative association between dividends payments 
and cash holdings. 
(vi) Non-cash liquid assets 
The presence of non-cash liquid assets will provide a firms’ safeguard because of the low 
cost to convert liquid assets to cash. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) suggest that in the case of 
a company cash shortfall, non-cash liquid assets can be easily converted into cash, as they 
are cash substitutes. Based on the trade off theory, and on the empirical studies of Opler 
et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), and Al-Najjar and 
Belghitar (2011) the hypothesis is then:  
Hypothesis 6 (H6): There is a negative relation between the presence of non-cash 
liquid assets and cash holdings. 
(vii) Cash flow generated by the firm 
Cash is an outcome of the financing and investment activities (Dittmar et al., 2003) and 
based on the pecking order theory, firms prefer to fund themselves with resources 
generated internally before resorting to the market. Hence, firms with large cash flows 
will keep higher cash levels, as defended by Opler et al. (1999) and Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004).  In contrast, and according to the trade off theory, Kim et al. (1998) suggest that 
cash flow provides a source of liquidity, which is a cash substitute, and defend a negative 
relation between cash flow and cash holdings. We accordingly hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 7 (H7): There is a relation between cash flow generated by the firm 
and cash holdings, the sign of which is ambiguous 
(viii) Percentage of voting rights owned by the largest shareholders 
In contrast to an average shareholder, a large one can easily monitor the management 
team. Consequently the agency costs between management and shareholders are expected 
to be lower (Stiglitz, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). This suggests that the cost of 
external financing would be lower for firms with large shareholders, implying less need 
to hold large cash balances. On the other hand, large shareholders might have incentives 
to increase the amount of funds under their control to invest according to their self-
interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). These arguments suggest a positive relationship 
between large shareholders and cash holdings. Therefore we hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 8 (H8): The expected relation between the voting rights’ percentage 
owned by the largest two shareholders and cash holdings is ambiguous. 
(ix) Percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board 
Independent non-executive directors add expertise and objectivity that ostensibly 
mitigates managerial entrenchment of firm resources (Harford et al., 2008) and their goal 
is also to act in shareholders’ interests. Hence, we expected that independent non-
executive directors would minimize managers’ autonomy, thus the anticipated relation 
between cash holdings and percentage of the independent non-executive directors on the 
board is negative. 
Hypothesis 9 (H9): There is a negative association between the percentage of 
independent non-executive directors on the board and cash holdings. 
(x) Board size  
The largest firms tend to have larger boards (Boone et al., 2007). At the same time, if we 
assume that larger firms are more successful than small ones and larger boards are more 
efficient regarding the monitoring role, these would imply an easy access to financial 
markets. Hence, it is expected a negative relation between board size and cash levels, 
according to our next research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 10 (H10): There is a negative relation between cash holdings and 
board size. 
The following table, based on the previous hypotheses, summarizes the impact of each 
firm characteristic on cash holdings. 
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Table 3: Hypotheses summary 
Characteristic 
Expected relation with cash 
holdings 
Growth opportunities Positive 
Firm size Positive/Negative 
Leverage Negative 
Ratio long term debt over total debt Negative 
Dividend payments Negative 
Non-cash liquid assets Negative 
Cash flow generated by the firm Positive/Negative 
Percentage of voting rights owned by 
the largest two shareholders 
Positive/Negative 
Percentage of the independent non-
executive directors on the board 
Negative 
Board size Negative 
 
Additional Hypotheses 
 
The financial literature suggests many motives for cash holdings assuming stable 
economic environment. However, the existence of a financial crisis could modify the 
expectations concerning the cash holdings behavior. Almeida et al. (2004) suggest that 
constrained firms need to increase their liquid assets, and Campello et al. (2010) find that 
constrained firms suffer from limited access to external funding.  
Concerning the growth opportunities, firm size, debt maturity structure, dividend 
payments, and non-cash liquid assets proxies we expect similar associations to the ones 
presented above. However, in the post-crisis period and considering the trade-off theory, 
we could also expect a weaker sign relatively to growth opportunities, dividend payments 
and non-cash liquid assets variables. This is due to the fact that financial constraints lead 
firms to increase their precautionary cash holdings. In comparison to the previous 
hypotheses, we thus expect different coefficient signs regarding leverage and cash flow 
generated by the firm variables7.  
 
 
                                                             
7 The analysis regarding the financial crisis only focuses on financial characteristics. Hence we won’t 
hypothesize the impact of financial crisis on governance factors. 
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(xi) Leverage 
In a post-crisis period the “new lending declined substantially across all types of loans” 
(Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). Consequently, in order to minimize the likelihood of 
financial distress and due to the shortage of credit bank supply (Campello et al., 2010), 
highly leveraged firms may tend to accumulate higher levels of cash. Moreover, Acharya 
et al. (2007) also predict a positive association between cash levels and leverage for 
constrained firms with high hedging needs. Then, for a post-crisis period we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 11 (H11): A positive association between leverage and cash levels is 
expected in a post-crisis period. 
(xii) Cash flow generated by the firm 
The post-crisis period is characterized by a more selective supply of credit by financial 
institutions. The cash flow generated by the firm acts as a source of liquidity (Kim et al., 
1999), thus we expect a negative association between cash flow generated by the firm and 
cash holdings.  
Hypothesis 12 (H12): In a post-crisis period, the expected association between 
cash levels and cash flow generated by the firm is a negative one. 
The following table summarizes the additional hypotheses. 
Table 4: Additional hypotheses 
Characteristic Hypothesis 
Leverage Positive 
Cash flow generated by the firm Negative 
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4. Data Description  
 
The sample targets the firms listed in the Euronext Lisbon, excluding financial institutions 
because their balance sheet is affected by specific factors such as industry rules and 
regulatory laws. Regarding the sports firms, whose financial year is different from the 
civil year, we assume that the utilization of their data would not significantly affect the 
comparability with other firms. After these adjustments, the sample is a panel of 43 firms 
over the period of 1995 to 2015. The accounting data and the market value for equity are 
taken from Datastream database. Regarding the governance factors, we hand-collect data 
from the firms’ Annual Reports and Annual Governance Reports available on their 
website. Next, we proceed by presenting the dependent variable and independent 
variables8 and their descriptive statistics. In addition we describe the research 
methodology used. 
 
4.1 Dependent Variable 
 
The purpose of this research is to study the determinant factors of cash holdings, thus the 
dependent variable will be cash holdings and is measured through a cash ratio. We follow 
the empirical studies of Kim et al. (1998), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Guney et al. (2007), 
and Bates et al. (2009) and define cash ratio as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to 
total assets.  
Fig. 2 shows the evolution of the average cash ratio throughout 1995-2015. During this 
period we can identify a growth trend until 2011, followed by a general decline in the 
ensuing years. 
                                                             
8 In the annex A table 10 presents a summary of both dependent and independent variables.  
25 
 
Figure 2: Cash ratio development 
 
Note:  The figure shows the mean cash ratio development for the sample of 43 Portuguese firms from the 
period of 1995 to 2015. Cash ratio, is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. Missing 
observations were excluded. 
 
4.2 Independent Variables 
 
Due to data limitations, we distinguish the independent variables across two main groups. 
The first one includes proxies for financial characteristics, and contains data concerning 
43 firms over the period between 1995 and 2015. The second group is composed by 
governance data, and holds data for the period between 2004 and 2015. The following list 
introduces the financial characteristics that we study: 
1. Growth Opportunities (GROWOP) – the proxy for growth opportunities that we use is 
the market-to-book ratio. We estimate the market value of firms’ assets as the book value 
of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. Then, the market-
to-book ratio is given by the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets 
(Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
2. Firm Size (FIRMSIZE) – the proxy used is the natural logarithm of total assets (Ferreira 
and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). 
3. Leverage (LEV) – We measure this using the ratio of total debt/total assets-cash and 
cash equivalents (Opler et al., 1999). 
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4. Debt Maturity Structure (DEBTMAT) – the proxy for debt maturity is the ratio of the 
long-term debt/total debt (Teruel and Solano, 2008). 
5. Dividend Payments (DIVIDEND) – the effects of dividend payments are measured by 
a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid dividends in each year and zero if it 
did not (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
6.  Non-cash liquid assets (LIQ) – based on previous empirical studies (Opler et al., 1999; 
Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) the presence of non-cash liquid assets 
is measured by the ratio of working capital minus cash, over total assets. 
7. Cash Flow Generated by the Firm (CFLOW) – the cash flow generated by the firm is 
measured by the ratio of pre-tax profits plus depreciation, deflated by total assets (Ozkan 
and Ozkan, 2004). 
Regarding the governance variables, we use three governance factors to test the above 
mentioned hypotheses: (i) the percentage of voting rights owned by the largest two 
shareholders (EOBS), (ii) board size (BSIZE), measured by the total number of board 
members (Drobetz and Grüninger, 2007) and (iii) the ratio of independent non-executive 
directors to the total board members (INED). 
Additionally, in accordance with previous studies (Kim et. al, 1998; Drobetz and 
Grüninger, 2007) we also introduce an additional control variable. This control variable 
is the Return on Assets (ROA), measured by the ratio of net income to total assets and the 
value is expressed in percentage. The ROA is a proxy of how profitable the firm is relative 
to its assets. In addition, ROA gives an idea as to how efficient management is at using 
the firm’s assets.  
 
4.3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 5 below presents the descriptive statistics for each of the variables we use in the 
analysis. 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
CASH  0.063004  0.038800  0.614636  0.000000  0.078286 735 
CASH_2  0.078486  0.040367  1.594949  0.000000  0.141119 735 
GROWOP  1.209185  1.067357  17.17937  0.473764  0.752805 690 
FIRMSIZE  13.26953  13.17148  17.56864  9.337854  1.681299 735 
LEV  0.432147  0.422033  1.721854  0.000000  0.221477 735 
DEBTMAT  0.591504  0.635633  1.000000  0.000000  0.268589 735 
DIVIDEND  0.649928  1.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.477335 697 
DIVIDEND_2  0.012257  0.004486  0.214887  0.000000  0.021233 694 
LIQ -0.109203 -0.085108  0.581461 -1.778580  0.218197 726 
CFLOW  0.062792  0.071652  1.724968 -2.244025  0.142915 732 
EOBS  0.662534  0.680000  1.200000  0.101000  0.237545 329 
BSIZE  8.930091  8.000000  25.00000  2.000000  4.250320 329 
INED  0.170679  0.142857  0.777778  0.000000  0.182338 329 
ROA  2.675929  3.720000  137.6200 -94.17000  10.17307 705 
ROA_2  3.438441  4.780183  166.4116 -224.4368  14.08035 705 
This table shows the sample characteristics for the 43 firms over the period 1995 to 2015 (except for EOBS, 
BSIZE and INED which were only available between 2004 and 2015). The dependent variable is CASH, 
measured as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. CASH_2 is the ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents to net assets, where net assets is the difference between total assets and cash and cash 
equivalents. GROWOP is the ratio of book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value 
of equity to book value of assets. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. DEBTMAT is the ratio of long-term debt to total 
debt. DIVIDEND is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid dividends in each year and set zero 
otherwise. DIVIDEND_2 is the ratio of the dividends paid over to total assets. LIQ is the ratio of working 
capital minus cash to total assets. CFLOW is the ratio of pre-tax profits plus depreciation to total assets. 
EOBS is the percentage of the voting rights owned by the largest two shareholders. BSIZE is the total 
number of board members. INED is the percentage of non-executive independent members on the board. 
ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. ROA_2 is the ratio of EBIT9 to total assets. 
 
4.4. Methodology  
 
This study intends to analyze and test a number of hypotheses regarding the determining 
factors of cash holdings for a sample of 43 Portuguese listed firms over the period of 1995 
to 2015, through panel data methodology. 
Panel data is a dataset in which the behavior of entities is observed across time. Panel 
datasets allow to control for individual heterogeneity, use more data and obtain more 
variability. Panel data analysis can better find effects that are not observable in cross 
sections or time series data (Baltagi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2013). 
The most common methods, suggested by the majority of literature, dealing with panel 
data are the pooled OLS, the fixed effects and the random effects models. We will perform 
                                                             
9 EBIT = Earnings before interests and taxes. 
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the appropriate tests in order to identify which model is more suitable to the properties of 
the dataset in this paper.  
In order to take advantage of the majority of the sample observations and get reliable 
results, we will perform a basic model and then an alternative model.  Thus, the first one 
will use as independent variables the financial factors described in earlier sections. The 
alternative model, while applied to a smaller period, will also focus on corporate 
governance factors, while maintaining the financial factors as independent variables. 
The basic empirical model is as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 (4.3.1) 
 
where i refers to the firm and t to the year time period. 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 is the dependent variable, 
the cash ratio of the firm i and year t. Concerning the content of the right side of the 
equation, 𝑐 is the constant term. The remaining variables are the firm characteristics, 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑂𝑃, 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸, 𝐿𝐸𝑉, 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐴𝑇, being respectively, growth opportunities, firm 
size, leverage and debt maturity. 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷 is a dummy variable that is set to one if the 
firm paid dividends in each year and set zero otherwise. 𝐿𝐼𝑄, 𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴 refer to 
non-cash liquid assets, cash flow generated by the firm and return on assets, respectively. 
Finally, 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. Take into account that we are performing fixed and random 
effects models thus, the error term is composed by 𝛼𝑖 which captures all unobserved, 
time-constant factors that affect the dependent variable, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 which represents 
unobserved factors that change over time and affect the 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 (Wooldridge, 2013). 
Then, based on the equation (4.3.1) we perform a sensitivity analysis by adding corporate 
governance factors.  
 The alternative model is as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 (4.3.1) 
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The governance factors added to the previous model are: 𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑆, 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 and 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐷, and 
these represent, respectively, the percentage of voting rights owned by the largest two 
shareholders, the total number of board members and the percentage of independent non-
executive directors on the board.  
The last goal of the present study is to understand the influence of the financial crisis of 
2008 on the financial characteristics of cash holdings. In order to do that, we will slip the 
equation (4.3.1) along the two different time periods, and perform separated analyses. 
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5. Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
In this section we present the results of the regressions analysis. This is divided into four 
different subsections. Firstly, we show and analyse the results of the basic empirical 
model. Then, the conclusions concerning the relation between the governance variables 
and cash levels are described. In addition to the estimation of the equations (4.3.1) and 
(4.3.2), the third section presents the robustness checks. Lastly, we present an analysis 
concerning the impact of the financial crisis on the regression coefficients, by comparing 
the results for the pre-crisis and post-crisis subsamples. 
5.1. Basic Empirical Model  
 
We start by running equation (4.3.1) with pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects 
models. The following table 6 presents the estimation outputs. 
Table 6: Estimation output of equation (4.3.1) 
Independent variable Pooled OLS   Fixed Effects   Random Effects   
const  0.051119 ** 0.049647   -0.026411  
  (0.025728)  (0.062250)   (0.041171)  
GROWOP  0.009487 ** 0.003838 ** 0.003641 * 
  (0.004202)  (0.001884)   (0.001880)  
FIRMSIZE  -0.003970 * -0.001713   0.004052  
  (0.002173)  (0.004781)   (0.003383)  
LEV  0.029037  0.105160 *** 0.090658 *** 
  (0.037195)  (0.030181)   (0.033581)  
DEBTMAT  0.020923 * -0.032327 ** -0.014140  
  (0.010953)  (0.014305)   (0.014401)  
DIVIDEND  0.040965 *** 0.017346 *** 0.016701 *** 
  (0.008164)  (0.006128)   (0.005687)  
LIQ  -0.032822  0.040510  0.007780  
  (0.020656)  (0.026938)   (0.023915)  
CFLOW  -0.169049 *** -0.111136 *** -0.138636 *** 
  (0.038524)  (0.035798)   (0.035621)  
ROA  0.002778 *** 0.001610 *** 0.002040 *** 
    (0.000733)   (0.000525)   (0.000533)   
R-squared  0.149298  0.654213   0.119747  
Adjusted R-squared 0.109861  0.611143   0.108461  
Obs.  633  633   633  
F-statistic  3.785772 *** 15.18968 ***  10.61085 *** 
F-test 19.5388 ***     
LM test     543.561 *** 
Hausman test     161.011 *** 
Table 6 presents the estimates of the parameters in equation (4.3.1) with pooled OLS, fixed effects and 
random effects models. The dependent variable is CASH, measured as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents 
to total assets. C is the constant term. GROWOP is the ratio of book value of assets minus book value of 
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equity plus market value of equity to book value of assets. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. DEBTMAT is the ratio 
of long-term debt to total debt. DIVIDEND is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid dividends 
in each year and set zero otherwise. LIQ is the ratio of working capital minus cash to total assets. CFLOW 
is the ratio of pre-tax profits plus depreciation to total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistical 
significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. In addition, the table also presents the 
outputs estimation of F-test, Breush-Pagan Lagrande Multiplier (LM) and Hausman tests. 
 
In order to identify the most suitable model, we perform three statistic tests: F-test, 
Breush-Pagan Lagrande multiplier (LM) and the Hausman tests. Firstly, an F-test allows 
us to understand if the observed and unobserved fixed effects are equal to zero (i. e. they 
are equal across all units). In this case, the p-value is significant, hence pooled OLS model 
is not appropriate. Next, we perform the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (Breusch 
and Pagan, 1980), which helps to choose between pooled OLS and random effects 
models. The result rejects the null hypothesis, validating the random effects model. 
Finally, in order to select the most suitable model between the fixed effects and random 
effects models, we perform the Hausman (1978) test. The result rejects the null 
hypothesis, so the most suitable model is the fixed effects model. Hence, our main focus 
is on the results of the fixed effects model, however the pooled OLS and random effects 
are displayed as well, but only for comparison purposes. 
The model includes additional year dummies to control for variables that are constant 
across firms but evolve over time and to capture the influence of aggregate time-series 
trends. We also perform standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity in order to validate 
our inference. The probability of a Wald test equaling 0.01 suggests that the year dummies 
are globally significant (annex B, table 11).Concerning collinearity, we perform the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) (annex B, table 12) among the explanatory variables in a 
regression and all VIF’s are below the value of 10, therefore it is reasonable to assume 
that there are no major issues regarding collinearity (Wooldridge, 2013). 
The R-square value indicates that 65% of the variance regarding the cash ratio is 
explained by the contributions of the independent variables. In addition, the p-value of 
the global significance test of the model suggests a high reliability and accuracy of the 
independent variables to explain the dependent variable. 
In accordance with our hypothesis 1 (H1), the regression results suggest that firms with 
better growth opportunities (GROWOP) have larger cash holdings. The positive and 
significant coefficient for GROWOP variable is consistent with previous findings (e.g. 
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Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
The variable coefficient is also in agreement with the expected signal for the trade-off 
and pecking order theories, and contradicts the free cash flow theory. The results are 
positive and statistically significant across all of the three estimation models. 
We hypothesize in (H2) an ambiguous relation between cash levels and firm size 
(FIRMSIZE), and according to our estimation outputs, there is no statistically significant 
relation between both variables. However, if we ignore firm heterogeneity, the firm size 
variable has a negative and statistically significant relation with cash levels. These results 
support the trade-off theory, according to which larger firms tend to hold lower cash levels 
due to economies of scale. Moreover, the negative coefficient coincides with previous 
findings (e.g. Opler et al. (1999) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004)). 
Contrary to our hypothesis 3 (H3), the sign of leverage (LEV) variable is positive, which 
means that more leveraged firms tend to hold more cash. This result contradicts the 
empirical evidences of Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004), and the pecking order and free cash flow theories. The trade-off theory is 
not clear regarding the predicted sign for this relation, but the argument that highly 
leveraged firms need higher cash balances to prevent financial distress, as Lins et al. 
(2010)10, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Guney et al. (2007) also refer in their empirical 
work, could be an explanation for this variable’s coefficient sign.  
The association between cash holdings and debt maturity structure (DEBTMAT) is 
aligned with hypothesis 4 (H4), which previewed a negative relation between both 
variables. This result is also consistent with the empirical findings of Teruel and Solano 
(2008), which suggest that firms with a shorter debt maturity structure keep higher levels 
of cash in order to avoid financial distress in case of difficulties regarding the renewal of 
their credits.  
We hypothesize (H5) a negative relation between the dividend payments (DIVIDEND) 
and cash holdings. However, the estimation output contradicts our hypothesis 5, and 
                                                             
10 Lins, et al. (2010) survey chief financial officers from 29 countries to study whether and why firms use 
lines of credit versus excess cash for their liquidity. They conclude that excess cash protects against “future 
cash flow shocks in bad times” (Lins, et al, 2010, p. 175), while credit lines give firms the option to exploit 
future business opportunities. These findings might be in agreement with a possible positive interaction 
between cash levels and leverage, namely if we assume that high levered firms have more default risk, as 
suggested by trade-off theory. In contrast, this might also explain the negative association between cash 
levels and growth opportunities expected by the free cash flow theory. 
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shows a positive and significant relation, which is in accordance with the findings of 
Drobetz and Grüninger (2007). This result suggests that the dividend paying firms may 
be particularly averse to omitting dividends and tend to hold larger amounts of cash 
(Drobetz and Grüninger, 2007).11  
The expected association between non-cash liquid assets (LIQ) and cash levels is 
negative, as stated in hypothesis 6 (H6). Against our expectations, the estimation output 
suggests a positive relation, but it is statistically non-significant. 
Finally, the cash flow generated by the firm (CFLOW) is negatively related with cash 
holdings. Thus, firms with large cash flows tend to keep lower cash levels, this conclusion 
being in line with the trade-off theory and the empirical findings of Kim et al. (1998) and 
Guney et al. (2007). On the other hand, this result contradicts the pecking order theory, 
which suggests that firms prefer to fund themselves with internal resources and then firms 
with larger amounts of cash flow will maintain higher cash levels. 
Overall, we can conclude that the characteristics of corporate cash holdings among the 
Portuguese listed firms are mostly in line with the expectations of the trade-off theory, in 
contrast, the model with least support is the free cash flow theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
11 In section 5.3. we perform a robustness check substituting the dummy variable for dividend payments 
(DIVIDEND) by a new proxy measured by the ratio of the dividend paid over total assets (DIVIDEND_2). 
In contrast with the dummy variable, we do not find a significant relation between the amounts of dividend 
paid and cash levels. 
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5.2. Alternative Model 
 
Concerning the analysis of the governance characteristics, we estimate equation (4.3.2). 
The following table presents the corresponding results: 
Table 7: Estimation output of equation (4.3.2) 
Independent variable Pooled OLS   Fixed Effects   Random Effects   
const 0.174345 *** -0.187034  0.034789  
 (0.052676)  (0.176535)  (0.074366)  
GROWOP 0.002843  -0.024262  0.000817  
 (0.015780)  (0.015215)  (0.013971)  
FIRMSIZE -0.009729 *** 0.019229  0.001259  
 (0.003431)  (0.013694)  (0.005972)  
LEV 0.074882  0.167192 *** 0.127533 ** 
 (0.049859)  (0.050981)  (0.062327)  
DEBTMAT 0.003936  -0.047493 * -0.027608  
 (0.021071)  (0.028057)  (0.023978)  
DIVIDEND 0.053375 *** 0.022037 * 0.033545 *** 
 (0.011297)  (0.012949)  (0.012057)  
LIQ -0.026986  0.061379  0.026181  
 (0.028000)  (0.039979)  (0.039273)  
CFLOW -0.167423 *** -0.167943 *** -0.151967 *** 
 (0.044557)  (0.057605)  (0.054933)  
RoA 0.002676 *** 0.002451 *** 0.002388 *** 
 (0.000832)  (0.000783)  (0.000801)  
EOBS -0.106870 *** -0.017585  -0.072914 * 
 (0.029636)  (0.023849)  (0.039453)  
BSIZE 0.002117 * -0.003782  -0.000618  
 (0.001158)  (0.003405)  (0.002309)  
INED 0.013459  0.091517 * 0.096333 * 
  (0.033838)   (0.050741)   (0.054012)   
R-squared 0.354974  0.721122  0.195664  
Adjusted R-squared 0.308569  0.647858  0.164836  
Obs. 299  299  299  
F-statistic 7.649521 *** 9.842720 *** 6.346906 *** 
F-test 7.562 ***     
LM test     60.632 *** 
Hausman test     168.908 *** 
Table 7 above presents the coefficient estimates of equation (4.3.2) with pooled OLS, fixed effects and 
random effects models. The dependent variable is CASH, measured as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents 
to total assets. C is the constant term. GROWOP is the ratio of book value of assets minus book value of 
equity plus market value of equity to book value of assets. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. DEBTMAT is the ratio 
of long-term debt to total debt. DIVIDEND is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid dividends 
in each year and zero otherwise. LIQ is the ratio of working capital minus cash to total assets. CFLOW is 
the ratio of pre-tax profits plus depreciation to total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. 
EOBS is the percentage of the voting rights owned by the largest two shareholders. BSIZE is the total 
number of board members. INED is the percentage of independent non-executive members on board. 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistical 
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significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. In addition, the table also presents the 
outputs estimation of F-test, Breush-Pagan Lagrande Multiplier (LM) and Hausman tests. 
The previous estimation is the output of the equation (4.3.2) with the pooled OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects models. The estimation contains data regarding the time 
between 2006 and 201512. In the same way as in estimation of equation (4.3.1.), to identify 
most suitable model we perform three statistic tests: F-test, Breush-Pagan Lagrande 
multiplier (LM) and the Hausman test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980; Hausman, 1978). The 
results are in line with the previous estimation, thus the most suitable model is the fixed 
effects model. The estimation of equation (4.3.2) also includes year dummies to control 
for variables that are constant across firms but evolve over time and to capture the 
influence of aggregate time-series trends. The standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity in order to validate our inference. 
The comparison between the common variables among the estimation’s output of 
equation (4.3.1) and the estimation’s output of equation (4.3.2) shows that the variables 
LEV and CFLOW maintain equal statistical significance and the coefficients’ sign. 
Additionally, the variables DEBTMAT and DIVIDEND lose part of its statistical 
significance. However, they continue to be significant and maintain the coefficient’s sign 
equal to the previous estimation. In contrast with the equation (4.3.1), the variable 
GROWOP is not statistically significant13. A justification for this variation is the different 
period of analysis of the equation (4.3.2). In accordance with the equation (4.3.1), the 
variables FIRMSIZE and LIQ are not statistically significant. 
Regarding the meaning of the governance variables, the relation between the percentage 
of voting rights owned by the largest two shareholders (EOBS) and cash holdings is not 
statistically significant. However, if we ignore the firm heterogeneity, the variable EOBS 
is statically significant and has negative sign. This suggests that firms with larger 
shareholders tend to hold less cash. This result is in accordance with the argument that 
firms with larger shareholders tend to efficiently monitor managers, which implies lower 
agency costs (Stiglitz, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny 1986) and consequently a cheaper 
access to external financing. The result is in line with the findings of Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004) and Guney et al. (2007) regarding the impact of ownership concentration. 
                                                             
12 Due to scarcity of governance data, the estimation ignores the years 2004 and 2005.  
13 This result is in line with the estimation concerning the post-crisis period, see section 5.4. 
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In contrast to the findings of Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), our results suggest a significant 
relation between the percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board 
(INED) and cash levels. However, the sign is positive, which contradicts hypothesis 9 
(H9). This result is aligned with the findings of Harris and Raviv (2008) which suggest 
that outside board control could be value-reducing. 
In similar way as Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) the board size variable (BSIZE) is not 
statistically significant. However, if we consider the pooled OLS model, the variable 
BSIZE has a positive impact on cash levels, which contradicts hypothesis 10 (H10) and 
suggests that firms with larger boards tend to accumulate higher levels of cash. If we 
assume the amount of cash holdings proxy for agency costs, then this result is in line with 
the observations of Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) about the performance 
of large firms, and results of  Yermack (1996), which suggest that smaller boards are 
more efficient regarding decision-making matters.  
The previous results suggest that governance factors play an interesting role in 
determining the cash holdings in our sample of Portuguese listed firms. However, at same 
time, the significance is weaker. 
 
5.3. Robustness Checks 
 
In this section we perform five robustness checks in order to verify the evidence presented 
above. First, we change the proxy for the dependent variable by using the ratio of cash 
and cash equivalents to net assets (CASH_2) instead, where net assets is the difference 
between total assets and cash and cash equivalents14. Next, we again run the estimation 
of the models substituting the independent variable DIVIDEND by the ratio of the 
dividend paid over the total assets (DIVIDEND_2). Then, we run the estimation of the 
models by excluding the sports firms. As mentioned before, sports firms have a different 
financial year, their financial year starts in July and ends in June. Following, we exclude 
the yearly dummy for controlling unobserved effects. Lastly, aiming to understand if the 
control variable influences our results, we again run the estimation of the models 
substituting the control variable by the ratio of EBIT to total assets. 
                                                             
14 Opler et al. (1999), and Ferreira and Vilela (2004) used the previous ratio as proxy for cash holding in 
their empirical studies. 
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Table 8 exhibits the output of the regression estimations15 of the equation (4.3.1), where 
the specification (1) introduces a change in the dependent variables, in specification (2) 
we substitute the dividend proxy. The specification (3) applies the estimation to a sample 
without sports firms, and specification (4) excludes the yearly dummy variables. Finally 
the specification (5) we substitute the control variable. We applied the same robustness 
checks to the equation (4.3.2), the output is present on the annex C, table 14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
15 The robustness analysis is made through the model analysed before, the fixed effects model. The panel 
tests rejected pooled OLS and random effects models. 
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Table 8: Robustness checks of equation (4.3.1) 
 
Independent variable (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  (5)   
const 0.046780  0.023315  0.042360  -0.035515   0.101734   
 (0.101503) 
 (0.064220)  (0.065997)  (0.051590)  (0.073078)   
GROWOP 0.005517 ** 0.003100 * 0.004285 ** 0.003068  0.003432 **  
 (0.002704) 
 (0.001936)  (0.001896)  (0.001948)  (0.001937)   
FIRMSIZE -0.002791  0.001281  -0.001070  0.004345  -0.005487   
 (0.007665) 
 (0.004831)  (0.004995)  (0.004040)  (0.005491)   
LEV 0.214904 *** 0.101907 *** 0.115976 *** 0.108014 *** 0.115522 ***  
 (0.084669) 
 (0.030403)  (0.031870)  (0.029932)  (0.030195)   
DEBTMAT -0.060322 ** -0.034565 ** -0.038761 ** -0.023163 * -0.039805 ***  
 (0.029042) 
 (0.014335)  (0.015614)  (0.014437)  (0.014468)   
DIVIDEND 0.023486 ** -  0.017221 *** 0.014325 ** 0.020777 ***  
 (0.010280) 
 -  (0.006386)  (0.005771)  (0.006373)   
DIVIDEND_2 -  0.149204  -  -  -   
 - 
 (0.128640)  -  -  -   
LIQ 0.081098  0.043895  0.051776  0.027838  0.052038 *  
 (0.049473) 
 (0.025889)  (0.029782)  (0.021966)  (0.032628)   
CFLOW -0.188429 *** -0.111679 *** -0.124597 *** -0.133486 *** -0.162767 **  
 (0.061332) 
 (0.036126)  (0.040101)  (0.036519)  (0.079602)   
ROA 0.002779 *** 0.001624 *** 0.001903 *** 0.001904 *** -   
 (0.000893) 
 (0.000512)  (0.000643)  (0.000522)  -   
ROA_2 -  -  -  -  0.001493 **  
 -  -  -  -  (0.000744)   
 
      
     
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes   
            
R-squared 0.673283  0.649956  0.654865  0.637825  0.643914   
Adjusted R-squared 0.632589  0.606356  0.611235  0.606710  0.600489   
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Obs. 633  633  598  633  633   
F-statistic 16.54489 *** 14.90729 *** 15.00943 *** 20.49914 *** 14.82815 ***  
Table 8 above presents the coefficient estimates of equation (4.3.1) with fixed effects. The dependent variable is CASH, measured as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to 
total assets. C is the constant term. GROWOP is the ratio of book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to book value of assets. FIRMSIZE is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. DEBTMAT is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. 
DIVIDEND is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid dividends in each year and zero otherwise. DIVIDEND_2 is the ratio of dividend paid over total assets. LIQ 
is the ratio of working capital minus cash to total assets. CFLOW is the ratio of pre-tax profits plus depreciation to total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. 
ROA_2 is the ratio EBIT to total assets. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by 
* at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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Concerning the basic empirical model, the change of the dependent variable (specification 
(1)) increases the adjusted R-square marginally, which suggests that the model is slightly 
more appropriate to explain the variable CASH_2. Additionally, there are no substantial 
changes regarding the variables’ statistical significance nor about the estimated 
coefficients’. In contrast with the positive association between cash holdings and payment 
of dividends founded in section 5.1., the specification (2) suggests that there is no relation 
between cash levels and the amount of dividend paid. Moreover, the behavior of the 
remaining variables of the regression is in line with the original model. The specification 
(3) shows that sports firms do not significantly affect the comparability among the other 
firms. The estimation without sports firms has similar coefficients and significance levels. 
The specification (4) suggests that the exclusion of yearly dummy variables diminishes 
the precision of the model. At the same time, the GROWOP variable stops being 
significant and DEBTMAT variable loses statistical significance. The remaining 
variables maintain the same significance and similar coefficients. Hence, there may be 
unobserved macro-economic or other effects, captured in the yearly dummies, that 
influence the cash levels. The specification (5) shows that the variables maintain similar 
coefficients and levels of significance. DEBTMAT and DIVIDEND variables even 
increase their significance level, while CFLOW and ROA obtains a smaller level of 
significance, although they are still significant at 5%. LIQ variable is significant, however 
only for 10%, thus we conclude that our inferences are not affected. 
Regarding the robustness checks of the alternative model, the estimates are present on 
annex C, table 14. As a general rule, the conclusions are in line with the robustness checks 
of the equation (4.3.1), which confirms the robustness of the models. 
In order to check that our variables are stationary we perform the Im Pesaran and Shin 
test (Im et al., 2003, cited in Baltagi, 2005). The null hypothesis is rejected for the larger 
part of our variables, except for BSIZE and INED variables (see annex C, table 15). Thus, 
excluding BSIZE and INED variables, the remaining variables are stationary in level. 
Then we test for first and second differences and we could conclude that BSIZE and INED 
variables are stationary at second differences (annex C, table 16). Afterward, we perform 
the respective original model replacing the BSIZE and INED variables by the stationary 
variables (annex C, table 17) and the differences concern the variable INED with 
significance at 10% and the gains of significance of GROWOP variable, the majority of 
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the variables maintain its significance levels, thus we could conclude that, as general rule, 
our deductions are not affected.  
 
5.4. Pre and Post-Crisis Analyses 
 
This section intends to understand if the relation between the cash ratio variable and its 
explanatory variables changed along the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Figure 2 in 
section 4.1. helps to understand how financial crisis had impacted the recent behavior of 
cash holdings. In order to perform this analysis, we split the sample between two time 
periods, the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Campello et al. (2010), study the effects of 
financial constraints during the financial crisis, and they identify that the difference 
between a constrained firms and its unconstrained control firms becomes much more 
pronounced in the 2008Q4, the “crisis peak period” (Campello et al., 2010, p. 478). 
Based on that, the pre-crisis period corresponds to the years between 1995 and 2008, and 
the post-crisis period starts in 2009 and goes until 2015. Figure 2 shows a clearly change 
in the pattern in the recent years, namely with the recent bottom in the year of 2008.  
Therefore, we run the regressions for each subsample in order to identify whether there 
is a change in the regression coefficients. In order to test the robustness of the results we 
compute these regressions for all of the three regressions models. According to the panel 
tests the suitable models for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods is the random effects 
and fixed effects models, respectively (annex B, table 13). The following table presents 
the output of the regression models. 
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Table 9: Estimation output of pre-crisis and post-crisis regressions 
 
 Pooled OLS Model  Fixed Effects Model  Random Effects Model  
Independent 
variable 
Pre-crisis    Post-crisis 
  
Pre-crisis    Post-crisis 
  
Pre-crisis    Post-crisis 
  
const 0.067441 * 0.019037  0.043438  0.032924  0.025105  -0.059123  
 (0.035545)  (0.037768)  (0.105815)  (0.230379)  (0.059738)  (0.069830)  
GROWOP 0.006312 * 0.029476  0.004728 ** -0.024960  0.004316 ** 0.004864  
 (0.003586)  (0.018669)  (0.001856)  (0.018874)  (0.001770)  (0.020244)  
FIRMSIZE -0.005902 * -0.001823  -0.005210  0.002101  -0.003787  0.007106  
 (0.003343)  (0.002948)  (0.008464)  (0.016472)  (0.005127)  (0.005421)  
LEV 0.047368  0.040155  0.150196 *** 0.145855 *** 0.145135 ** 0.092753 * 
 (0.063308)  (0.048691)  (0.055694)  (0.046599)  (0.057049)  (0.052423)  
DEBTMAT 0.028469 ** -0.015137  -0.014421  -0.048506  -0.004836  -0.030992  
 (0.013706)  (0.022010)  (0.016607)  (0.032368)  (0.015756)  (0.025361)  
DIVIDEND 0.022102 ** 0.060333 *** 0.025004 *** 0.010910  0.020304 *** 0.023955 ** 
 (0.010532)  (0.010082)  (0.007525)  (0.012842)  (0.006849)  (0.011125)  
LIQ -0.029702 * -0.012194  -0.002578  0.042723  -0.013702  0.014403  
 (0.018234)  (0.031239)  (0.024940)  (0.036144)  (0.021175)  (0.032657)  
CFLOW -0.011480  -0.217597 *** 0.024105  -0.120417 *** 0.016965  -0.142919 *** 
 (0.060709)  (0.049096)  (0.064088)  (0.055736)  (0.056723)  (0.052089)  
RoA 0.001368 * 0.003345 ** 0.000681  0.001934 *** 0.000846  0.002266 *** 
  (0.000684)   (0.001042)   (0.000697)   (0.000778)   (0.000602)   (0.000800)   
R-squared 0.120311  0.201536  0.666413  0.744074  0.200729  0.104621  
Adjusted R-
squared 0.065656  0.158209  0.602134  0.677723  0.182512  0.077488  
Obs. 360  273  360  273  360  273  
F-Statistic 2.201280 *** 4.651463 *** 10.36747 *** 11.21419 *** 11.01874 *** 3.855892 *** 
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Table 9 above presents the coefficient estimates of equation (4.3.1) with pooled OLS, fixed effects and 
random effects models. The dependent variable is CASH, measured as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents 
to total assets. C is the constant term. GROWOP is the ratio of book value of assets minus book value of 
equity plus market value of equity to book value of assets. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. DEBTMAT is the ratio 
of long-term debt to total debt. DIVIDEND is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid dividends 
in each year and zero otherwise. LIQ is the ratio of working capital minus cash to total assets. CFLOW is 
the ratio of pre-tax profits plus depreciation to total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistical 
significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
First of all, we can identify that the variable GROWOP is positive and statistically 
significant in all three models during the pre-crisis period. In contrast with the post-crisis 
period, the variable is not significant in any model. Based on the trade-off theory, this 
finding could suggest that in the post-crisis the benefits from the growth opportunities of 
the firm were reduced while the opportunity costs of large cash reserves increased. The 
result is also in agreement with the empirical work of Lins et al. (2010), which suggests 
that credit lines give firms the option to exploit future business opportunities and excess 
cash protects them against future cash flow shocks. In addition, this finding is in 
accordance with the research Campello et al. (2010), they find that “nearly 90% of 
constrained companies say that financial constraints restrict their pursuit of attractive 
projects, and more than half of these firms are forced to cancel valuable investments” 
(Campello et al., 2010, p. 486). 
Regarding the firm size variable (FIRMSIZE), the pooled OLS model shows a negative 
and significant association with cash levels during the pre-crisis period. However, this 
variable is not statistically significant during the post-crisis period. Concerning the fixed 
effects and random effects models, in spite of the opposite coefficient signals across the 
two periods, the variable is not statistically significant in any of these models.  
The variable leverage (LEV) is statistically significant in both fixed effects and random 
effects models. The variable coefficient in the post-crisis period is in accordance to the 
hypothesis 11 (H11) which argues that in post-crisis period high leveraged firms tend to 
accumulate high cash balances in order to avoid financial distress. In addition, if we 
analyze pre and post-crisis coefficients, then we can identify that post-crisis’ coefficients 
are always smaller than the pre-crisis’ coefficients. Assuming that a high leverage ratio 
means a good relation with banks (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Guney et al., 2007), hence 
in the post-crisis period the small coefficients suggest the existence of credit restrictions 
(Campello et al., 2010). 
44 
 
The LIQ and DEBTMAT variables (non-cash liquid assets and the ratio of long term debt 
over total debt, respectively) are only significant in the pre-crisis period with the pooled 
OLS model.  
Concerning the relation between dividend payments and cash levels, we identify positive 
and statistically significant coefficients using pooled OLS and random effects models 
along the two periods. Then, we identify a larger coefficient in the post-crisis periods. 
This result suggests that firms that pay dividends tend to accumulate higher levels of cash. 
This could mean that in the post-crisis periods, firms tend to retain larger amounts of cash. 
This could be a symptom of the financial restrictions and the reduction in the willingness 
to lend by banks. 
The cash flow generated by the firm variable (CFLOW) is not statistically significant in 
any model during the pre-crisis period. However in the post-crisis period, the coefficient 
is negative and statistically significant over the three estimation models. This result is in 
line with hypothesis 12 (H12) and suggests that firms with larger cash flows tend to 
accumulate lower levels of cash, hence cash flows act as liquid assets substitutes. This 
finding also suggests that in the post-crisis there are no opportunities for firms to 
accumulate cash. 
To conclude, the previous results suggest that the financial crisis of 2008 impacted on the 
relation between cash levels of Portuguese firms and its determining factors. In particular, 
regarding the growth opportunities and the cash flow generation variables. The first one 
cease to be significant in the post-crisis period, which could be justified by the absence 
of growth opportunities or the delay of investment in a context of post-financial crisis. 
The variable cash flow generated by the firm is significant and with a negative sign in the 
post-crisis period, which could suggest that firms are recurring to internal funds. This 
could related to the shortage of credit in financial markets. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The present study investigates the determinants of corporate cash holdings for listed firms 
in Portugal, using panel data for the period of 1995 to 2015. The main results of the 
regression analysis suggest significant and positive associations between cash levels and 
growth opportunities, leverage and dividend payments. In contrast, cash flow and longer 
debt maturity impact negatively on the levels of cash holdings. These findings are mostly 
in line with the trade-off theory while the theory less supported by our results is the free 
cash flow theory. 
Concerning the analysis of corporate governance factors, we find that the presence of 
independent non-executive directors on the board has a positive association with cash 
levels, however the significance is weak.  
Finally, we also examine the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on the relation between 
cash levels and its characteristics, by computing regressions for a pre and a post-crisis 
samples. The results suggest a decrease in significance of growth opportunities in the 
post-crisis period, which suggests the lack of growth opportunities or the delay on 
investment policies in post-crisis period. In addition, the variable for cash flow generated 
by the firms, which was not statistically significant until 2008, starts to be significant in 
the post-crisis period and with a negative coefficient. Thus, we can argue that in the post-
crisis period, the firms’ cash flow starts to act as a liquid assets substitute, which 
evidences the difficulties in getting loans from banks in this period.  
Regarding future research suggestions, based on the significant association between the 
governance characteristics and the cash levels, a more detailed study of the relation 
between cash holdings and governance characteristics is suggested. Moreover, as Figure 
2 of section 4.1. suggest there are possible pattern changes in the year 2011. The study of 
the implications regarding this possible change of pattern on cash holdings’ behavior 
could be a good exercise, even more appreciated because 2011 symbolizes the year of the 
financial assistance to Portugal.  Moreover, we think that a study concerning the financial 
crisis’ impact on cash levels across a sample of European Monetary Union’s listed firms 
might prove fruitful.  
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Annexes 
 
Annex A – Variables description 
 
Table 10: Description of variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition 
CASH Cash and cash equivalents / Total assets 
CASH_2 
Cash and cash equivalents / (Total assets – Cash and 
cash equivalents) 
  
GROWOP 
(Book value of assets – Book value of equity + Market 
value of equity) / Book value of assets 
FIRMSIZE Ln (Total assets) 
LEV Total debt / (total assets – cash and cash equivalents) 
DEBTMAT Long-term debt / Total debt 
DIVIDEND 
Dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid 
dividends in each year and set zero otherwise 
DIVIDEND_2 Dividend paid / Total assets 
LIQ 
(working capital – cash and cash equivalents) / Total 
assets 
CFLOW (Pre-tax profits + depreciation) / Total assets 
 
EOBS  
Percentage of voting rights owned by the largest 2 
shareholders 
BSIZE Total number of board members 
INED 
Number of independent non-executive directors / Total 
number of board members 
  
ROA Net income / Total assets 
ROA_2 EBIT / Total assets 
51 
 
Annex B – Statistic tests 
 
Table 11: Wald test 
 Statistic Prob. 
Wald test 36.1939 0.01 
The table presents the output estimation of Wald test. 
 
Table 12: Collinearity Statistics 
Independent variable VIF 
GROWOP 1.17 
FIRMSIZE 1.74 
LEV 1.38 
DEBTMAT 1.67 
DIVIDEND 1.51 
LIQ 1.79 
CFLOW 4.03 
RoA 4.19 
The table presents the outputs of the estimation of the variance inflation factor.  
 
Table 13: Panel tests III 
Pre-crisis period    
    Statistic Prob 
F test  13.8846 0.00 
LM test   349.265 0.00 
Hausman test 7.25913 0.51 
    
Post-crisis period   
    Statistic Prob 
F-test  10.9564 0.00 
LM test   57.0843 0.00 
Hausman test 30.4839 0.00 
The table presents the outputs estimation of F-test, Breush-Pagan Lagrande multiplier (LM) and Hausman 
test. 
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Annex C – Robustness checks 
 
Table 14: Robustness checks of equation (4.3.2) 
 
Independent variable (1)  (2)   (3)   (4)  (5)  
const -0.473356   -0.234864  -0.300972  -0.224721   0.022248   
 (0.318862)  (0.181693)  (0.203308)  (0.173706)  (0.193294)  
GROWOP -0.054829  -0.028279 * -0.017782  -0.021266 * -0.024374  
 (0.035507)  (0.015500)  (0.015212)  (0.012180)  (0.016474)  
FIRMSIZE 0.039712  0.024575 * 0.026281 * 0.021479 * 0.005851  
 (0.024734)  (0.013940)  (0.015784)  (0.013303)  (0.014980)  
LEV 0.385350 ** 0.157572 *** 0.204378 *** 0.165435 *** 0.165374 *** 
 (0.150461)  (0.050433)  (0.055376)  (0.052674)  (0.049368)  
DEBTMAT -0.092977 * -0.048968 * -0.065104 * -0.053823 * -0.060616 ** 
 (0.056041)  (0.029998)  (0.033189)  (0.029635)  (0.030564)  
DIVIDEND 0.036539  -  0.025719 * 0.021023 * 0.020988 * 
 (0.025073)  -  (0.013619)  (0.012121)  (0.012204)  
DIVIDEND_2 -  0.111778  -  -  -  
 -  (0.157952)  -  -  -  
LIQ 0.145967  0.059187  0.064641  0.068193  0.083938  
 (0.092488)  (0.039476)  (0.043316)  (0.042719)  (0.040888)  
CFLOW -0.356728 *** -0.165249 *** -0.229099 *** -0.169857 *** -0.668470 ** 
 (0.129193)  (0.057542)  (0.065620)  (0.059788)  (0.349244)  
ROA 0.005025 *** 0.002402 *** 0.003404 *** 0.002459 *** -  
 (0.001694)  (0.000766)  (0.000904)  (0.000825)  -  
ROA_2 -  -  -  -  0.006588 ** 
 -  -  -  -  (0.003112)  
EOBS -0.020410  -0.016050  -0.012312  -0.005324  -0.032896  
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 (0.045685)  (0.024566)  (0.024647)  (0.023774)  (0.025536)  
BSIZE -0.004782  -0.003971  -0.003876  -0.003818  -0.002962  
 (0.005312)  (0.003488)  (0.003437)  (0.003446)  (0.003510)  
INED 0.103507 * 0.077391 * 0.091120 * 0.106254 ** 0.104257 ** 
 (0.060684)  (0.048000)  (0.052302)  (0.048948)  (0.053070)  
           
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  
                   
R-squared 0.739150  0.717269  0.732201  0.712688  0.731041  
Adjusted R-squared 0.670621  0.642992  0.658369  0.650535  0.661269  
Obs. 299  299  274  299  299  
F-statistic 10.78603 *** 9.656712 *** 9.917070 *** 11.46663 *** 10.47760 *** 
Table 14 above presents the coefficient estimates of equation (4.3.2) with fixed effects model. The dependent variable is CASH, measured as the ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets. C is the constant term. GROWOP is the ratio of book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to book value of assets. 
FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. DEBTMAT is the ratio of long-term debt to 
total debt. DIVIDEND is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid dividends in each year and zero otherwise. DIVIDEND_2 is the ratio of dividend paid over total 
assets. LIQ is the ratio of working capital minus cash to total assets. CFLOW is the ratio of pre-tax profits plus depreciation to total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to 
total assets. ROA_2 is the ratio EBIT to total assets. EOBS is the percentage of the voting rights owned by the largest two shareholders. BSIZE is the total number of board 
members. INED is the percentage of independent non-executive members on board. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis under each 
coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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Table 15: Im, Pesaran and Shin test output I 
Variable Statistic Prob. 
CASH -5.95957  0.0000 
GROWOP -3.48927  0.0002 
FIRMSIZE -5.28760  0.0000 
LEV -3.33335  0.0004 
DEBTMAT -5.85664  0.0000 
DIVIDEND -3.26306  0.0006 
LIQ -6.30082  0.0000 
CFLOW -3.93670  0.0000 
ROA -2.84327  0.0022 
BSIZE  1.02929  0.8483 
INED -0.62845  0.2649 
EOBS -25.7928  0.0000 
Table 15 presents the Im, Pesaran and Shin tests in level for each of variable of our study. 
 
 
Table 16: Im, Pesaran and Shin test output II 
First difference    
Variable Method  Statistic Prob. 
BSIZE Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat    -1.34472  0.0894 
2nd difference level       
 Method 
 Statistic Prob. 
BSIZE 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat    -3.90599  0.0000 
Im, Pesaran and Shin t-bar  -5.06696  
  T-bar critical values:  1% level  -5.31200   
 
 5% level  -3.66400  
    10% level  -3.21200   
Second difference    
Variable Method   Statistic Prob. 
INED Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat    -1.59360  0.0555 
2nd difference level    
  Method   Statistic Prob. 
INED 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -2.08669  0.0185 
Im, Pesaran and Shin t-bar  -4.11795  
  T-bar critical values:  1% level  -5.68400   
  5% level  -3.85000  
    10% level  -3.31600   
Table 16 presents the Im, Pesaran and Shin tests for BSIZE and INED variables according the first and 
second differences. 
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Table 17: Alternative model II 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Random Effects      
C 0.093657 * -0.206937  -0.010156  
 (0.050524)  (0.213617)  (0.063042)  
GROWOP -0.012147  -0.065964 ** -0.011590  
 (0.014945)  (0.025017)  (0.013016)  
FIRMSIZE -0.002233  0.022908  0.004616  
 (0.003242)  (0.016153)  (0.004200)  
LEV 0.106848 *** 0.215874 *** 0.175410 *** 
 (0.038912)  (0.043590)  (0.061341)  
DEBTMAT -0.021484  -0.081018 * -0.048170 * 
 (0.022129)  (0.041193)  (0.028618)  
DIVIDEND 0.056222 *** 0.032296 ** 0.035384 *** 
 (0.009987)  (0.013880)  (0.012066)  
LIQ 0.000106  0.053476  0.044252  
 (0.024462)  (0.047154)  (0.038143)  
CFLOW -0.149394 *** -0.208550 *** -0.178942 *** 
 (0.042774)  (0.065372)  (0.062218)  
ROA 0.002074 *** 0.002623 *** 0.002558 *** 
 (0.000663)  (0.000945)  (0.000897)  
EOBS -0.078185 *** -0.038896  -0.057552 ** 
 (0.020327)  (0.033910)  (0.028002)  
D(BSIZE,2) -0.000283  0.000817  -0.000206  
 (0.003533)  (0.002299)  (0.002709)  
D(INED,2) -0.000647  0.001459  0.004301  
 (0.047122)  (0.030281)  (0.033621)  
R-squared 0.419300  0.734838  0.300295  
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.363463  0.637983  0.264826  
Obs. 229  229  229  
F-statistic 7.509413 *** 7.586961 *** 8.466430 *** 
Table 17 presents the coefficient estimates of equation (4.3.2) with pooled OLS, fixed effects and random 
effects models. The dependent variable is CASH, measured as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total 
assets. C is the constant term. GROWOP is the ratio of book value of assets minus book value of equity 
plus market value of equity to book value of assets. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEV 
is the ratio of total debt to total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. DEBTMAT is the ratio of long-
term debt to total debt. DIVIDEND is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid dividends in each 
year and zero otherwise. LIQ is the ratio of working capital minus cash to total assets. CFLOW is the ratio 
of pre-tax profits plus depreciation to total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. EOBS is 
the percentage of the voting rights owned by the largest two shareholders. D(BSIZE,2) is the stationary 
variable at second difference level, where BSIZE is the number of board members. D(INED,2) is the 
stationary variable at second difference level, where INED is the percentage of independent non-executive 
members on board. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis under each 
coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
